

10 minutes for quiz

then we will go over it

when you are done w/quiz,
give to Onila and you can do
whatever until 10:10

write "I was here" or "I was
not here"

re: Wednesday

1. (2 points) For each set notation symbol below, write its name or meaning in English. The first is filled in for you as an example.

- (a) \mathcal{P} : power set
- (b) \in : element of, in
- (c) \subseteq : subset
- (d) \cup : union
- (e) \cap : intersection

$[\]$ $[\]$
 $|\emptyset| = 0$
 $\mathcal{P}(\emptyset) =$
 $|\{\emptyset\}| = 1$

2. (3 points) Circle True or False for each of the following statements.

- (a) $A \cap B = \{x : x \in A \text{ and } x \in B\}$: True or False
- (b) $5 \in \{n^2 : n \in \mathbb{Z}\}$: True or False
- (c) $\mathcal{P}(S)$ is the set of all elements of S : True or False

$\{1, 4, 9, \dots\}$
 $\mathcal{P}(S)$ is the set of all subsets of S
 $\mathcal{P}(S) = \{X : X \subseteq S\}$ $S = \{x : x \in S\}$

3. (5 points) Given the following preference lists as input for the hospital/medical student matching problem.

X: A , B, C	A: Y, X, Z
Y: B, A, C	B: X, Y , Z
Z: A , B, C	C: X , Y, Z

- (a) Is the matching $M = \{(X,A), (Y,B), (Z,C)\}$ stable? Circle one: Yes or No
- (b) How do you know?

no unstable pairs

- (c) Is the matching $M = \{(X,C), (Y,B), (Z,A)\}$ stable? Circle one: Yes or No
- (d) How do you know?

(X,A) is unstable

GALE-SHAPLEY (preference lists for hospitals and students)

INITIALIZE M to empty matching.

WHILE (some hospital h is unmatched and hasn't proposed to every student)

$s \leftarrow$ first student on h 's list to whom h has not yet proposed.

IF (s is unmatched)

Add $h-s$ to matching M .

ELSE IF (s prefers h to current partner h')

Replace $h'-s$ with $h-s$ in matching M .

ELSE

s rejects h .

RETURN stable matching M .

demo

Does G-S always terminate?

Does G-S always return a stable matching?

What are T about G-S alg?

① Once a student becomes matched, they never become unmatched. T

② Once a student becomes matched, they only trade up for better hospitals. T

- (3) Once a student becomes matched, they only trade down for worse hospitals. F
- (4) Once a hospital becomes matched, it never becomes unmatched. F
- (5) A hospital only trades up for better students. F
- (6) A hospital only trades down for worse students. T
- (7) A hospital will never propose to the same student twice. T
- (8) The last student a hospital proposes to is the one it ends up with. T

Claim: the while loop executes at most n^2 times.

proof: Each iteration of the while loop consists of a proposal.

By (7), a hospital will never propose to the same student twice.

Because there are only n^2 pairings of students and hospitals, there are only n^2 possible proposals.

we did not
get past
here in
class ↓

So the while loop executes at most n^2 times.

Claim: The set M returned by G-S is a stable matching.

Proof: let M be the matching returned by an execution of G-S on some input.

For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there is an unstable pair with respect to M .

This means that there are two pairs $(h, s) \in M$ and $(h', s') \in M$ such that:

- h prefers s' to s $\boxed{h \text{ } s' \text{ } (s)}$
- s' prefers h to h' $\boxed{s' \text{ } h \text{ } (h')}$

so (h, s') is the unstable pair.

By (6), s was the last student h proposed to.

Notice that h prefers s' to s , so by (6) h must have proposed to s' in the past. But by (2), s' only trades up for better hospitals, so s' never would have moved from h to h' .

We have arrived at a contradiction, so no unstable pair can exist. So M is a stable matching.